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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ROBERT E. MANNING, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES M. POWERS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7276 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
QUESTIONS. P'RESENTED 
The questions presented by this appeal are briefly 
this: 
1. Is the driver of an automobile permitted to care-
lessly and negligently kill an eleven year old boy and 
escape the consequences? 
2. Will the verdict of a jury which exonerates the de-
fendant stand where the undisputed evidence shows that 
he was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the 
death of the boy? 
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3. Will not this ·Court in this ·case follow the same law 
it has announced in innumberable cases in the past and 
reverse the case where the trial court by his instructions 
commits error prejudicial to the plaintiff? 
· S:TA·TEMENT O~F FACTS 
We will set forth the evidence with some detail that 
this court may correctly answer the questions presented 
here. 
The testimony shows that the defendant left his home 
in Brigham City on the early morning of October 6, 1947, 
intending to drive to his employers place of business at 
Murray, Utah. He was alone and was driving a maroon 
colored 1946 Nash Sedan. He says he arrived at the Hot 
Springs in Salt Lake ~City about 8 :40 A. M. The Springs 
are about two miles north from where the accident hap-
pened. We have no testimony as to the speed he drove ex-
cepting immediately preceding the accident but he must 
have driven at a rapid rate of speed since the accident 
occurred within a few minutes of 8 :40. The defendant 
testified that he first observed the decedent, Robert 
Manning, the son of the plaintiff, Robert E. Manning, 
coming out of a lane or driveway near the center of the 
block between Sixth and Seventh South Streets on Second 
West; that the boy turned south and rode his bicycle either 
on the extreme westerly edge of the pavement or on the 
shoulder of the road (Tr. 215). His testimony as to the 
distance that he was from the boy at that time is variable. 
-He testified that he was 3-0 or 40 feet a way and also said 
that it might have been 60 or 70 feet away. He further 
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testified that he was driving In the second lane next to 
the center of the highway; that when Robert was almost 
parallel with him he turned his bicycle without any warning 
directly east and struck the rear of the right front fender 
of the automobile and was thrown from the bicycle and 
killed. He admitted that he gave no warning of the ap-
proach of his automobile and that he was traveling ap-
proximately 25 or 30 miles per hour. The defendant's 
testimony is disproven not only by the physical facts but 
by all the eye witneses to the accident. 
The physical facts show that the rear mud guard of 
the bicycle was struck by the right front fender of the car 
near the headlight. ·The maroon color in the indentation 
near the headlight w!J.ere it struck the bicycle was knocked 
off and the maroon color paint from that fender was in the 
indentation in the rear mud guard where it had been hit. 
Ulrich Stark, a disinterested witness saw the accident and 
testified that he saw Robert riding his bicycle in a southerly 
direction and that he was either on the extreme westerly 
edge of the pavement or on the shoulder next it; that he 
saw the automobile strike the bicycle at the rear (Tr. 178-
180) and that the automobile was going at a speed of from 
40 to 45 miles per hour (Tr. 190) and that no warning was 
given of the approach of the automobile. 
Mr. LeRoy Iverson, one of the officers investigating 
the accident and who measured the brake marks of the 
automobile, estimated the speed of the automobile from 40 
to 45 miles per hour (Tr. 144). 
Robert Barnett, a thirteen year old schoolmate of the 
deceased, testified that he was standing on the east side of 
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the street in front of the Jensen Tire Company Store at 
665 South Second West; that Robert was riding his bicycle 
either on the graveled part of the road or on the west part 
of the cement pavement; that he was carrying his lunch; 
that he called to Robert and sa~d, "Well, if it isn't Manning," 
(Tr. 305·) and that Robert took his left hand off the handle-
bar and waved to him; that Robert kept going south and 
when he reached a point at the south side of the lane be-
tween 6:64 and 672 on Second West (those points are all 
shown on Exhibit A, the map in question) the automobile 
driven by the defendant struck the rear of the bicycle and 
Robert was knocked off and fell to the pavement. (Q) And 
the automobile did strike the back of the bicycle, didn't it? 
(A) Yes, from what I could see. (Q) As far as you could 
see the automobile hit the bicycle right back here (indicating 
the dent in the rear mud guard) didn't it? (A) Yes (Tr. 
307). Robert was not going very fast and I didn't hear the 
sounding of the horn (Tr. 308). 
The other testimony does not change the foregoing 
facts. Boys who were in close proximity to the accident 
but did not see the actual striking of the bicycle by the auto-
mobile testified that they saw Robert riding his bicycle 
either on the west side of the paved portion of Second West 
or immediately on the shoulder and that as he proceeded 
south Bobby Barnett called to him and that Robert waved 
his left hand and continued riding; that there were two 
cars parked on the west side of the highway in close proxi-
mity to the paved portion and that as Robert approached 
them he turned his bicycle slightly easterly as though to 
pass them and then was struck by the automobile. They all 
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testified that no warning was given whatever of the ap-
proach of the automobile. 
The body of the boy, when it finally came to rest was 
laying partly on the paved portion and partly on the 
shoulder with the bicycle close by. The lunch which the 
boy was carrying was scattered about along the shoulder 
and in close proximity to the bicycle. 
After the accident an examination of the car disclosed 
not only the dent in the right front fender which struck the 
rear of the bicycle but the handle of the car was bent and 
the dust had been wiped off the right front door. No doubt 
the boy was thrown into the air by the impact and as the 
body came down it swung back against the door, bent the 
handle and wiped some of the dust off the side of the car 
(Tr. 230). The collision, of course, bent the frame of the 
bicycle as well as damaging it otherwise. 
STATEMENT OF ER.RORS 
1. The verdict of the jury is not supported by the evi-
dence, is contrary to the great weight of the evidence and 
the Court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. 
2. The court erred in over-emphasizing and stressing 
the defense of contributory negligence. 
3. The court erred in giving its instruction No. 4. 
4. The court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's re-
quest No. 6. 
5. The court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's re-
quest No. 4. 
6. The court erred in giving its instruction No. 10. 
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ARGUMENT 
ERROR NO.1 
T·HE VERDJ:CT OF THE JURY IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE, IS CON'TRARY TO THE GREAT 
WEIGHT O·F T'HE E·VIDENCE AND THE COURT 
ERRED IN DENYING T'HE MOTlON F'OR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
Our statement of what the evidence shows makes it 
clear that the over-whelming weight of the evidence is to 
the effect that that defendant was guilty of negligence which 
solely and proximately caused the death of Robert. We are 
firmly convinced that the defendant did not see Robert until 
about the time the collision occurred. However, he says he 
was· watching the boy as he proceeded along the highway 
yet he never gave him any warning of the approach of the 
automobile. He didn't see the boy take his hand off the 
handlebars and wave to the Barnett boy across the street. 
This was seen by all the other boys. He says that when 
Robert was parallel with him that the boy turned his bicycle 
directly into the side of the automobile. This is disputed 
not only by the physical facts but by every other. witness 
in the case. The deposition of .the defendant was taken 
prior to the trial and in that deposition the defendant testi-
fied that when he first noticed the boy he was 30 feet ahead 
of him (Tr. 232~2;34). Yet at the trial he changed that to 
70 feet. He testified in his deposition that he saw the front 
wheel hit the car and heard the impact of the body when it 
hit the car (Tr. 235) and that the only marks on the car were 
a black rubber mark on the side and a dent below the handle 
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and that there were no other marks on the car (Tr. 236, 
237). Yet he knew at the time he was testifying at the 
deposition that there was a mark near the front head light 
and that it had been pointed out to him by the officer and 
that the maroon paint had been scraped therefrom and that 
the dent in the rear of the bicycle had maroon paint on it. 
The only place that paint was removed from the car was 
from the front of the fender near the headlight where it 
struck the wheel. The physical evidence clearly shows 
that the testimony of the defendant that the boy turned 
his bicycle into the side of the car is untrue. Those that 
saw the collision testified that the front of the car struck 
the rear of the bicycle. The evidence clearly shows such to 
be the fact. That the bicycle was struck from the rear can-
not be denied. Such being the fact, the defendant, of course, 
was negligent and should be made to respond in damages. 
The rule is almost universal that where the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain the verdict or where the verdict 
is contrary to the evidence, a new trial should be granted. 
"Where the evidence offered for the party for 
whom a verdict has been rendered, conceding to it 
the greatest probative force to which, according to 
the laws of evidence, it is fairly entitled, is insuf-
ficient to support or to justify the verdict, it is the 
duty of the court to set it aside and grant a new 
trial." 39 Amer. Juris. Sec. 132, Page 142. 
The trial court should have unhesitatingly granted a 
new trial and committed error in denying the motion. 
"Where a verdict is not sustained by sufficient 
evidence or is based on conjecture, a new trial should 
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be granted." Ingram vs. Dunning, 159 Pac. 927, 60 
Okl. 233. 
"Where the verdict is manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence, it should be set aside, and a 
new trial granted." Young Mining Co. vs. Bank, 296 
Pac. 247, 37 Arizona 521. 
"New trial should be granted if evidence ac-
credited by jury is improbable and probably untrue." 
Dennis vs. Stukey, 294 Pac. 276, 37 Arizona 299·. 
"Where a verdict contrary to strong and per-
suasive testimony was supported chiefly by inter-
ested and distrustful evidence, the case calls for the 
vigorous exercise of the trial courts prerogative to 
set it aside." Vidich vs. O·ccidental Mt. Benefits 
Ass'n, 196 Pac. 242, 108 Kan. 546·. 
See also Loth-Hoffman Clothing ~Co. vs. Swartz, 
176 Pac. 916, 7 4 Okl. 18 .. Krann vs. Stockton Elec-
tric 'Company, 101 Pac. 914, 10 Cal. App. 271. Denver 
Tramway Company vs. Owens, 36 Pac. 848, 20 Colo. 
107. T'idd vs. Railroad Co., 270 Pac. 138, 46 Idaho 
H52. Hennessey Oil and Gas Co. vs. Neely, 162: Pac. 
214, 62 Okl. 101. 
The testimony of the defendant and that of Bobby 
Barnett, the defendant's witness, is of no greater value to 
the defendant than as is shown on their cross examination. 
In this connection see the case of Porter vs. Hunter ( 60 
Utah 222, 20'7 Pac. 153) and Edwards vs. Clark (96, Utah 
121, 83. Pac. Second, Page 1021) wherein this court has held 
. 
"that the testimony of a witness is no stronger than as 
shown by the cross-examination." 
ERROR NO.2 
THE CO,URT' ERRED IN OVER-EMPHASIZING 
AND S.TRESSING T'HE DEF'ENSE O~F CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
The defendant in his answer alleged that Robert was 
guilty of contributory negligence and set forth in his answer 
nine separate purported acts of contributory negligence. 
Five of the purported acts of contributory negligence all 
go to one and the saJ.11e proposition, to-wit, that the deceased 
child turned in front of the defendant's automobile. In 
addition to setting forth that the deceased child turned into 
defendant's automobile the defendant also alleged that the 
deceased child failed to keep a lookout, failed to have con-
trol of his bicycle so as to avoid a collision and failed to 
use ordinary care to avoid the collision. 
The court in summarizing the pleadings in its instruc-
tion No. 1 specified each of the eight alleged grounds of 
~ontributory negligence. In instruction No. 4, the court 
again referred to the alleged contributory negligence upon 
the part of t~e deceased and stated that if the deceased con-
tributed in any degree to the collision, then the plaintiff 
could not recover. The court further, in instruction No. 4, 
attempted to define contributory negligence so far as it 
pertains to a child. The court erred in this particular, which 
will be discussed hereafter. The court again in instruction 
No.5 referred to the contributory negligence of the deceased, 
stating again that if the deceased was negligent in any of 
the particulars alleged in the answer, the plaintiff could 
not recover. 
Then in instructions 6, 7, 8 and 9, the court defined the 
duty of a motorist driving along and upon the highway. 
Then, in instruction No. 10, the court qualified its instruc-
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tion No. 8, and stated that the sounding of a horn in pass-
ing was a matter of discretion with the operator of the 
motor vehicle. 
The plaintiff's theory is set forth in instructions 6, 7, 
8 and 9, but qualified by instruction No. 10. 
In instruction No. 11, the court again refers to the 
contributory negligence of the deceased and states that if 
the deceased were guilty of contributory negligence in any 
particular, the plaintiff could not recover. In instructions 
Nos. 12; 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, the court repeats each of 
the alleged acts of contributory negligence as alleged in 
the answer of the defendant; and repeatedly states that if 
the deceased did the parti<:ular act as set forth in said in-
structions, Nos. 12 to 17, that the plaintiff could not recover. 
'The court gives four instructions on the plaintiff's 
theory of the case then qualifies one of them by instruction 
No. 10, and gives ten instructions repeatedly stating in ef-
fect that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence 
and impressing upon the minds of the jurors that that was 
the sole issue involved in the case. 
The continual repetition on the part of the court em-
phasizing the particular acts which the defendant alleged 
constituted contributory negligence on the part of the de-
ceased was error. 
In Kent v. Ogden L. & I. Railway Co., 167 P. 666, 50 
Utah 328, the court held that in charging on contributory 
negligence, the lower court should not undertake to name 
the specific things or acts which the jury may consider, but 
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should merely tell the jury to consider the evidence upon 
that subject and determine the question from a ,considera-
tion of the whole evidence, and at p. 341 of the Utah Reports 
further held that: 
"While it is true that the plaintiff in a negli-
gence case must recover, if at all, on one or more of 
the acts of negligence set forth in his complaint, yet 
in determining the question of contributory negli-
gence, the jury are not limited to the acts of negli-
gence described in the complaint but they may con-
sider any fact, inference or circumstance disclosed 
by the evidence upon that subject." 
The court further held : 
"It is always dangerous for a court to single 
out specific things or acts in charging the jury." 
the last quotation particularly relating to a charge on con-
tributory negligence. 
In Valiotis v. Utah Apex Mining Co., 184 P. 80~, 52 
Utah 151, the court held that it is improper for the trial 
court in its instructions to single out certain facts which the 
evidence tended to prove, and that the lower court in that 
case properly refused an instruction which singled out 
certain facts, holding that to do so invaded the province 
of the jury. 
See also International & G. N. R. Co. v. Newman, 
(Texas), 40 S. W. 854, wherein the court held that an in-
struction singling out a particular act and stating it would 
not constitute proper care where the issue involved was 
contributory negligence, was improper. So, in the case at 
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bar wherein the court in five of the instructions stated that 
if the deceased turned his bicycle from the path in which he 
was riding at the time of the accident in question and into 
the defendant's car that the plaintiff could not recover, 
would be error in view of the foregoing authorities in 
singling out one issue and prominently placing it before 
the jury. 
See also Blashfield's Instructions to Juries, 2nd Ed. 
Vol. 1, p. 343, and p. 351. In Sec. 152 of the same volume, 
the author states: 
"It is improper for the court to place too prom-
inently before the jury any principle of law involved 
in the case as by frequent repetition. Where a num-
ber of instructions announce in varying language a 
single rule of law, the effect is to unduly impress a 
single principle announced upon the jury's minds 
to the exclusion perhaps of other equally important 
principles." 
And in Carter v. Missouri K. & T. Railway Co., (Texas) 
160 S. W. 987, the court held that repeated reference to what 
defenses of the defendant will defeat recovery is improper 
and erroneous. In Meachem v. Hahn, 46 Ill. App. 149, the 
court held it is error to refer repeatedly to a fact or facts in 
evidence, as this is calculated to give undue prominence 
to such testimony. 
See also Gulf Railway Co. v. Harriett, 80 Texas 73. 
In Blashfield's Instructions to Juries, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1, 
Sec. 154, p. 353, the author states: 
"that a defendant has the right to demand the 
giving of a charge based upon a specified group of 
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facts which if found to be true would constitute a 
good defense, but this rule cannot be held to authorize 
or require the giving of numerous charges upon a 
single fact or group of facts constituting a single 
defense, merely because such charges are deftly 
phrased, and the practice of singling out one among 
several important issues and submitting it to the 
jury is imp.roper." 
In Randall's Instructions to Juries, Vol. 1, Sec. 431, p. 
77 4, the author states: 
"It is improper to single out a particular issue 
or defense so as to impress the jury with the idea that 
it is the controlling one-or to emphasize the theory 
of one party as compared with the theory of his ad-
versary." 
The lower court in the· case at bar in giving ten in-
structions on the contributory negligence of the deceased 
over-emphasized the defendant's theory and without ques-
tion influenced the jury in favor of the defendant. 
In Randall's Instructions to Juries, Vol. 1, Sec. 432, 
p. 785, the author states that instructions singling out 
certain facts bearing on an issue and telling the jury that 
they may or should consider such facts in determining 
such issue, although the jury are also told they should con-
sider such facts along with all the other evidence, are 
erroneous or properly refused. 
See also Condie v. Rio Grande, 34 U. 237, 97 P. 120, 
wherein the court held that it would be error to single out an 
isolated fact in a charge to the jury and that refusal to 
give such a charge was proper. 
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Reid's Branson Instruction to Juries, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, 
Sec. 105, pp. 290 and 291, states the law to the same purport 
and cites many cases to the effect that an instruction which 
lays especial stress upon certain features of the case in such 
a way as to take the jury's attention from other phases upon 
which there might be a recovery should not be given, even 
though they assert a correct principle of law, and further 
that objectionable prominence occur~ where the court un-
necessarily stresses the question of contributory negligence. 
See Freire v. Kaupman, 281 N. Y. S. 408. 
See also Wiser v. Copeland, (Ariz.), 203 P. 5,65, where-
in the court held an instruction which laid undue stress on 
one fact to the exclusion of all others proper to be considered 
in determining the issue of negligence erroneous, and the 
court laid particular stress and emphasis upon the defend-
ant's rights without relation to the rights of the plaintiff. 
The court in that case, which was a negligence case, in-
volving the use of the highway, instructed the jury that the 
defendant had the right to use the right-hand side of the 
highway, or any portion thereof, and failed to state to the 
jury the duties the defendant owed to the plaintiff in his 
use of the right portion of said highway, and over-em-
phasized the defendant's rights without relation to the plain-
tiff's rights; this the court said was error. 
It is obvious from the foregoing authorities that the 
court in instructing the jury in the case at bar, not only 
over-emphasized the matter of contributory negligence, but 
failed, in instructing the jury on the question of contributory 
negligence, to inform them of the plaintiff's rights in this 
connection. 
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ERROR NO.3 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRU·CTION NO. 4, 
AND 
ERROR NO.4 
THE ·COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAIN·TIFF'S REQUEST NO. 6 
Both Errors Nos. 3 and 4 may be considered together, 
both going to the proper manner of instructing the jury as 
to the contributory negligence of a minor. 
The court in its instruction No. 4 gave the following 
instruction: 
"You are instructed that if you find by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the deceased child, 
Robert Manning, was contributorily negligent in 
one or more of the particulars alleged by the de-
fendant, and that such negligence, if any, on his 
part proximately caused and contributed in any de-
gree to the collision and his death, then the plaintiff 
cannot recover in this case, regardless of the negli-
gence, if any, of the defendant, and each of the fol-
lowing instructions regarding the right, if any, of 
the plaintiff to recover is subject to this qualifica-
tion. 
''You are instructed in this connection that said 
Robert Manning was under a duty to exercise that 
degree of care for his own safety which would ordi-
narily be used by an ordinarily prudent boy of the 
same age, capacity, and experience. 
"The age, capacity and experience of the said 
Robert Manning are factors which you may take 
into consideration together with all of the evidence 
in the case in determining whether or not the de-
fendant was negligent, so far as such factors were 
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known to or in the exercise of ordinary care could 
have been seen by the defendant, or the said Robert 
Manning was contributorily negligent in accordance 
with these instructions. 
"Each of the participants in the collision are 
presumed to have acted as reasonably prudent per-
sons until proof is made." 
In the above instruction the court stated that if the 
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence he could 
not recover. Then, in paragraph 2 of the instruction the 
court attempted to qualify its previous statement as to con-
tributory negligence by stating that the deceased was under 
a duty to exercise that degree of care for his own safety 
which would ordinarily be used by an ordinarily prudent 
boy of the same age, capacity and experience. This qualifi-
cation is to some extent true. But in paragraph 3 of the 
instruction, the court goes on to say that the age, capacity 
and experience of the deceased were factors which the jury 
might consider in determining the defendant's negligence, 
so far as such factors were known to the defendant. This, of 
course, was a gross error on the part of the court and was 
not a correct statement of the law as has been laid down 
by this Honorable Court. The age, capacity and experience 
of the child are rna tters which the jury are to take into 
consideration in determining whether or not the child was 
guilty of contributory negligence. It is not how the age, 
capacity and experience appear to the defendant. 
In Gesas v. Oregon Short Line, 93 P. 2·74, 33 Utah 156, 
the court at p. 17 4, lays down the rule that a child is not 
negligent or contributorily negligent if he exercises that 
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degree of care which, under like circumstances would be 
expected of one of his years and capacity. 
In Herald v. Smith, 190 P. 932, 56 Utah 304, the court 
held at p. 308 of the Utah Reports that: 
"The degree of care required of a child must be 
graduated to its age, capacity and experience, and 
must be measured by what might ordinarily be ex-
pected from a child of like age, capacity and ex-
perience under similar conditions. If it acted as 
might reasonably be expected of , such a child, it 
cannot be charged with contributory negligence." 
The court in so holding quoted the above referred to 
Gesas case and also the case of Groesbeck v. Lake Side Print-
ing Co., 186 P. 103, 55 Utah 335. 
It is for the jury to determine whether the child in 
question did what might ordinarily be expected from a child 
of like age, capacity and experience under similar conditions. 
It is not how the age, ·capacity and experience appeared or 
were known to the defendant. In the court's instruction No. 
4, the court states that the jury may consider the age, 
capacity and experience, and then qualifies that statement in 
paragraph 3 by stating that it is for the jury to con~ider 
these factors so far as they appeared to the defendant. Such 
is not a correct statement of the law. The court is confusing 
the factors the jury should consider in determining the con-
tributory negligence of a child with the degree of care 
which the defendant owes to the child when the defendant 
knows a child is involved. 
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The plaintiff in his requests for instructions requested 
the court to give the following instruction, going to the con-
tributory negligence of the decease~ child : 
"You are instructed that the defendant contends 
that the deceased was guilty of contributory negli-
gence and in the particulars set forth in the de-
fendant's answer, and that such acts upon the part of 
the deceased were the sole cause or contributed to 
any accident to him and his death; in such respect 
the court charges you that in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, it is presumed that the deceased ex-
ercised due care ·for his o,wn safety. The general· 
rule as to an adult, if it be shown that he was guilty 
of negligence which directly and proximately con-
tributed to an accident and injury sustained by him 
bars recovery for damages by him for any injury re-
sulting from the fault or negligence of another, or 
in case of his death, recovery by his beneficiary. But, 
the same conduct and degree of care required of an 
adult to be exercised by him for his own safety does 
not in full force apply to a child of 11 years of age. 
Such a child or person is required to exercise only 
that degree of care and caution which persons of 
like age, ·capacity, experience and intelligence might 
be reasonably expected to naturally and ordinarily 
use under the same situation and like circumstances; 
thus, in determining whether the deceased was negli-
gent, as in the answer of the defendant alleged, you 
are entitled to and should take into consideration 
the age of the deceased, his experience and intelli-
gence, and his knowledge and appreciation of danger 
incident to riding his bicycle along the street in 
question, and if upon all the evidence in the case, 
you find that the deceased exercised such care and 
caution as naturally would be expected from a boy 
of like age, experience and intelligence under similar 
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circumstances and conditions, then you will find 
that the deceased was not guilty of contributory 
negligence." 
The above request is a correct stateme·nt of the law as 
is set forth in the above quoted decisions from this Honor-
able Court. 
ERROR NO.5 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST NO·. 4 
The plaintiff requested the court to give the following 
request: 
''You are instructed that it is undisputed that 
the defendant Powers in driving along and upon the 
highway at the time and place in question observed 
the deceased, Robert ·Manning, proceeding along and 
upon the highway in front of him upon his bicycle, 
that he intended to pass him and that he knew at 
said time that the deceased was a young boy. You 
are instructed that the degree of care to be exercised 
by the driver of an automobile is greater when the 
safety of a child or children is concerned, and when 
such facts are known to the operator of the auto-
mobile; and it is for you to determine whether or 
not Mr. Powers exercised that degree of care and 
caution at the time and place in question as would 
be exercised by an ordinary prudent person under 
the same circumstances, and if you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that in passing the de-
ceased, the defendant failed to exercise that degree 
of care and caution as an ordinary prudent person 
would exercise in passing a young boy on a bicycle, 
and the failure to exercise that degree of care was 
the sole, proximate cause of the accident in question, 
then your verdict would be in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant." · 
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Nowhere in the court's instructions did the court define 
the duty of the defendant when the presence of children was 
involved. The above request made by the plaintiff defines 
the duty of an automobilist driving along and upon a high-
way when the presence and safety of children are concerned. 
The court in its instruction No. 4 (supra) (referred to in 
the discussion of Errors 3 and 4) , in attempting to define 
what factors should be considered in determining whether 
or not a child was contributorily negligent confused those 
factors with the duty of a motorist when the presence of 
children was concerned. The defendant in the case at bar 
admitted on cross-examination that he saw and knew the 
deceased was a young boy and that he was riding a bicycle. 
Knowing these facts, it was incumbent upon the defendant 
to exercise a higher or greater degree of care along and 
upon the highway in question and in attempting to pass the 
deceased. 
This Honorable ,Court has held in many cases that 
children are prone to be less mindful of danger than are 
persons of mature years, and for that reason a greater de-
gree of care is required of a person who drives an auto-
mobile in close proximity to children than is required in 
driving in close proximity to mature persons. 
In the case of Herald v. Smith, 190 P. 932, 56 U. 304, 
the court says at p. 309 of the Utah Reports, that the 
operator of an automobile is only required to exercise ordi-
nary care or such care as an ordinarily prudent person 
would exercise under like or similar circumstances, and as 
indicated, 
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"The degree of care required to be exercised will 
be greater when the safety of children or others of 
immature judgment is involved and such facts are 
known to the operator of the car." 
The court in its instruction No.4 (supra) confused the 
above statement of law with the definition of contributory 
negligence involving a child. 
This court followed the above rule in the cases of 
Green v. Higbee, 244 P. 906, 66 U. 539, and in Woodward 
v. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 63 P. (2d) 267, 90 U. 578. 
In the Woodward case at p. 271 (Pacific Reporter) this 
court says: 
"It is a matter of common knowledge that chil-
dren are prone to be less mindful of danger than are 
persons of mature years. For that reason, a greater 
degree of care is required of a person who drives an 
automobile in close proximity to children than is 
required in driving in close proximity to mature 
persons." 
The court should have separately and as requested by 
the plaintiff in his request No. 6 (supra) stated to the jury 
the matters and things they should consider in determining 
contributory negligence on the part of a child, and then 
should have instructed the jury as to the duty of the de-
fendant at all times towards the child when the defendant 
knew that the deceased, which it is undisputed in this case 
that he knew, was a child. In other words, the court in in-
struction No. 4 told the jury that they ,could consider the 
age, capacity and experience of the deceased child in de-
termining contributory negligence but qualified the state-
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ment by stating "so far as those things appeared to the 
defendant." As stated before, nowhere in the court's in-
structions does the court instruct the jury that a higher 
degree is owing to a child than to a mature person, and this 
should certainly have been given to the jury when it was 
admitted by the defendant that he knew the deceased was 
a child. 
We respectfully call this Honorable Court's attention 
to the court's instructions Nos. 11 to and including 17. The 
examination of those instructions will reveal that the duty 
placed upon the deceased child is the duty required of an 
adult person, and although the instructions might be correct 
statements of the law so far as they pertain to adult per-
sons, they are not a correct statement of the law so far as 
they pertain to the case at bar. If the court insisted upon 
repeating contributory negligence in each of the above re-
ferred to instructions, as it did, then the court should have 
modified each of them by stating that they could only con-
sider the deceased contributorily negligent after they had 
taken into account his age, intelligence and experience. 
ERROR NO.6 
THE c·oURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
The court correctly stated the law in its instruction 
No. 8, wherein the court instructed the jury that a person 
driving an automobile coming from the rear shall by audible 
signal indicate his intention to pass a vehicle proceeding 
in front of him, and that failure to give an audible signal 
of intention to pass constitutes negligence. Then, in in-
struction No. 10, the court instructed as follows : 
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"You are instructed that the law of this state 
pertaining to the requirement of sounding a horn 
on a motor vehicle does not require the use of a horn 
in passing, if the driver of a vehicle intends to pass 
another vehicle under any and all circumstances. 
Therefore the question of sounding the horn is a 
matter which is left to the sound judgment of the 
operator of the motor vehicle in the exercise of ordi-
nary care, and the failure to sound a horn immedi-
ately prior to the happening of an accident does not 
consistute negligence as a matter of law." 
The above quoted instruction is not only contrary to 
law, but is in direct conflict with instruction No. 8. In-
struction No. 10 (supra) leaves the matter of sounding the 
horn to the sound judgment of the operator of the motor 
vehicle. This of course is absolutely contrary to the laws 
of Utah. Section 57-7-122, subdivision (b) U. ·C. A., 1943, 
provides as follows : 
"Except when overtaking and passing on the 
right is permitted, the driver of an overtaken ve-
hicle shall give way to the right in favor of the over-
taking vehicle on audible signal and shall not in-
crease the speed of his vehicle until completely passed 
by the overtaking vehicle." 
Section 57-7-206, subdivision (a) U. C. A., 1943, pro-
vides as follows : 
"Every motor vehicle when operated upon a 
highway shall be equipped with a horn in good work-
ing order and capable of emitting sound audible 
under normal conditions from a distance of not less 
than 200 feet, but no horn or other warning device 
shall emit an unreasonably loud or harsh sound or 
a whistle. The driver of a motor vehicle shall when 
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reasonably necessary to insure safe operation give 
audible warning with his horn but shall not other-
wise use such horn when upon a highway. 
The first section of the Code referred to provides that 
overtaken vehicles shall give the right of way on audible 
signal. ;The statute does not leave the matter to the sound 
discretion of the person overtaking, but makes it mandatory 
upon him to give an audible signal before passing. 'The sec-
ond section of the statute above referred to makes it manda-
tory upon the operator of an automobile to sound his horn 
when reansonably necessary to insure safe operation, and 
certainly where children are involved a horn is always re-
quired to be sounded in passing them in order to warn of the 
approach of the on coming vehicle and to insure them the 
safety they are entitled to. 
It is for the jury to decide whether it was necessary to 
give a warning at the time and place of the accident in 
question and not a matter to be left to the sound judgment 
of the defendant. 
Instruction No. 10 (supra) not only invades the prov-
ince of the jury but is in direct conflict with both of the 
above referred to statutes. It is not for the driver of the 
automobile to determine whether it is reasonably necessary 
to sound a horn, but it is for the jury to determine upon all 
the facts and circumstances in the case whether or not the 
person who is being overtaken is a person of rna ture years 
or is a child, and as stated before where a child is involved 
a higher degree of care is required and that degree of care 
is only exercised when a horn is sounded while passing a 
child. 
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We respectfully submit that the court erred in its in-
structions given; in its refusing to instruct as requested by 
plaintiff, and in overruling and denying plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial, and that the judgment of the jury and court 
should be reversed and a new trial granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLARD HANSO·N, 
STEWART M. HANSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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